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I Am Not Me. The (Re)construction of the Self 
in Graham Swift’s Ever After
Graham Swift’s Ever After (1992) is narrated by – in the protagonist’s own words – 
“a dead man.”1 Shaken by his father’s suicide, an uneasy relation with his mother 
and stepfather and finally by the suicide of his wife, Bill Unwin is troubled 
throughout his life by a  sense of inauthenticity and an obsessive desire to dis‑
cover patterns of signification which might free him from it. His desperate efforts 
to find a source of stable identity are repeatedly frustrated, leading ultimately to 
a suicide attempt, after which he embarks on a quest to understand his new self, 
the man “born again in plastic.”2 His stepfather’s manufacturing of plastic, the 
loathed financial base of Unwin’s unconvincing academic career, is juxtaposed 
with the imagery of the supposedly more authentic mining industry, brought into 
his narrative by the diaries of his Victorian ancestor. Unwin’s obsession with the 
artificiality of his own life is extended to the whole post‑World War II reality, 
which he associates with the production of synthetics and the empty language 
constructs of academia. His contempt for these is contrasted with a nostalgia for 
the well ‑ordered, “real” reality of the nineteenth century, which is in turn related 
in his narrative to the excavation of fossils and ores, advancing tangible, biologi‑
cal discovery and “organic” heavy industry. As Frederick Holmes observes,3 in 
being connected both to nature and technology, mining implies both the possi‑
bility of finding a core of identity, unearthed in its natural state like ore, and the 
need to refine, process, manufacture what is discovered.
1 Graham Swift, Ever After (London: Picador, 1992), 1.
2 Swift, Ever After, 9.
3 Frederick Holmes, “The Representation of History as Plastic: The Search for the Real Thing 
in Graham Swift’s Ever After,” ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature vol. 23, no. 7 
(1996): 25–43.
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Considered in the light of Freudo ‑Lacanian theory of mourning as a process 
analogous in many ways to Oedipal resolution and thus crucial to subject for‑
mation, Unwin’s gradual acceptance of his ambiguous and unresolvable attach‑
ment to the mourned and his rethinking of the strict distinction between the 
scorned substitute and the ever ‑elusive “real thing” may be seen as the reluctant 
achievement of what Tammy Clewell reads to be Freud’s recommendation “to 
relinquish the wish for a  strict identity unencumbered by the claims of the lost 
other or the past.”4 In Lacan’s terms, Unwin’s evolving worldview corresponds to 
the final stage of the process in which personhood is established, that of the sub‑
ject’s entry into the Symbolic, which necessitates accepting lack as constitutive of 
selfhood and involves abandoning the fantasy of an object that will conclusively 
satisfy desire. The task facing Swift’s protagonist, therefore, is that of detaching 
himself from the longing for the original lost object and instead accepting it as 
never having been in his possession, in order to be able to function within the 
social reality. Like Hamlet, on whom Unwin models himself, he needs to com‑
plete his symbolic castration, which, “for Lacan, involves the process of giving up 
the identification with this imaginary phallus, and recognizing that it is a signi‑
fier and as such was never there in the first place. What Freud called castration, 
therefore, is a symbolic process that involves the [subjects’] recognition of them‑
selves as ‘lacking’ something – the phallus.”5
Bill Unwin signals his fantasy of an ultimate plenitude beyond the limitations 
of the symbolic when he remarks early in the novel that the narrative is an attempt 
“to recover my substance.”6 Admittedly, he also expresses doubt about such recov‑
ery: in observing the change wrought in him by the suicide attempt, he states, refer‑
ring to seeing his own face in the mirror: “I recognize that I have never truly rec‑
ognized it.”7 Not only the possibility of returning to it, but the very existence of an 
“original” or “real” version of himself is thus put in doubt. Perhaps even more sig‑
nificantly, Unwin questions quite explicitly any notion that his “substance” might 
fit into the symbolic system: “these words, or rather the tone, the pitch, the style of 
them and consequently of the thoughts that underlie them, are not mine … this 
way in which I write is surely not me.”8 However, as his repeated declarations of 
searching for or indeed having found “the real thing”9 suggest, Unwin persistently 
attempts “to ignore loss as a  constitutive dimension of the human condition.”10
 4 Tammy Clewell, “Mourning beyond Melancholia: Freud’s Psychoanalysis of Loss,” Journal 
of the American Psychoanalytic Association 52, no. 1 (2004): 65.
 5 Sean Homer, Jacques Lacan (London: Routledge, 2005), 55.
 6 Swift, Ever After, 10.
 7 Ibid., 3.
 8 Ibid., 4.
 9 Ibid., 94, 149, 218, 251.
10 Stef Craps, Trauma and Ethics in the Novels of Graham Swift: No Short ‑Cuts to Salvation 
(Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 121.
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His wish to regain the sense of self ‑completion which he ascribes to the time 
before the deaths of his father and wife might be seen to express the pathologi‑
cal dimension of fantasy, present in many of Swift’s narrators who deny “the fail‑
ure of the symbolic to render us complete: the fantasy arises where the subject 
deludes itself that the symbolic knows what it is supposed to be. The subject is 
thus trying to install the Law without the price that the Law exacts, as if desire 
and drive were of one mind.”11 Fantasy functions as a veil, hiding from the sub‑
ject the trauma of castration understood as the realisation of the lack that the 
Other involves.12 “Through fantasy, the subject attempts to sustain the illusion of 
unity with the Other and ignores his or her own division.”13 To enter the sym‑
bolic, one has to abandon the illusion of complete satisfaction of desire and sub‑
ject oneself to the absolute otherness of the symbolic, a system which allows the 
articulation of desire, binding it with the desires of other subjects to the extent 
that “we are condemned to speak our desire through the language and desires 
of others.”14 Bruce Fink stresses that for Lacan “there is no signifier in the Other 
that can répondre de what I  am [meaning] ‘answer for,’ but [also] ‘account for,’ 
‘take responsibility for.’ It is not simply a signifier that tells you what you are but 
one that takes you under its wing, defines you, protects you, and constitutes your 
raison d’être. There is no such signifier, but not every mother allows her children 
to realize that.”15 Fink discusses this inadequacy of the Symbolic in the context 
of Hamlet’s inability to situate himself in it, caused, in Lacan’s view, by Gertrude, 
who posits herself as the signifier explaining all. In the case of Swift’s protagonist, 
it is his father who is taken to guarantee freedom from ambiguity and absence, 
freeing Unwin from the quest for the objet a which would make him whole again, 
and give him a firm sense of identity. After his father’s death, Unwin looks for the 
same kind of guarantee in the clearly symbolic constructs of literature, romantic 
love and history and, as Stef Craps demonstrates, he is disappointed each time. 
In rejecting the inadequacy of substitutes, Unwin insists on returning to a state 
in which he feels himself complete, negating the claim of psychoanalysis that “to 
come into being as desiring subjects we are forced to acknowledge the impos‑
sibility of the total fulfilment of our jouissance.”16 Unwin obsesses over his lost 
objects, the ever ‑elusive “real thing,” even though he acknowledges that, in the 
words of his stepfather, “the real stuff is running out, it’s used up, it’s blown away, 
11 Elizabeth Wright, Speaking Desires Can Be Dangerous (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1999), 5.
12 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1996), 61.
13 Homer, Jacques Lacan, 87.
14 Ibid., 70.
15 Bruce Fink, “Reading Hamlet with Lacan,” in Lacan, Politics, Aesthetics, ed. Willy Apol‑
lon and Richard Feldstein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 190.
16 Homer, Jacques Lacan, 99.
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or it costs too much.”17 However, his wish to reverse the process of castration is 
impossible to satisfy since, as Elizabeth Wright points out, for Lacan the loss of 
a  loved object leads to a melancholic reaction in which “the trauma of this loss 
forces a repetition of the original entry into the symbolic” and this involves pre‑
cisely paying the price of “a renewed acceptance of castration.”18 Lacan presents 
castration as the process of giving up the imaginary phallus, the object presumed 
by the child to fulfil completely the mother’s desire, normally imagined to be pos‑
sessed by the father. The child’s realisation that the mother’s desire is not directed 
at him or her in its entirety marks the collapse of the pre ‑Oedipal union between 
the two and the child’s attempt to become the completing object for the mother 
is an inevitably failed endeavour to re ‑establish the union. This failure forces the 
child to recognise that the mother is also a  desiring subject, marked by a  lack, 
and to have its desire repressed by a third figure intervening between the mother 
and the child, enforcing an interminable delay of the satisfaction. Therefore, the 
transition from the influence of the mother to that of the intervening third (the 
“Name ‑of ‑the ‑Father”) involves exchanging the lure of satisfaction for an end‑
less deferral of desire in a constant shift from one signifier to another, all char‑
acterised by the same absence.19 Failure to mourn conclusively the sense of self‑
completion associated with the imaginary phallus on the symbolic level and to 
accept castration results in a disturbance both in the subject and in the system of 
signification: “The work of mourning is first of all performed to satisfy the dis‑
order that is produced by the inadequacy of signifying elements to cope with the 
hole that has been created in existence, for it is the system of signifiers in their 
totality which is impeached by the least instance of mourning.”20 Paradoxically, 
Unwin appears to be aware that the system of signifiers that he suspects his father 
of dreaming up is an illusion. Remembering his father as caught in a longing for 
an imaginary world of old values, he wonders whether Colonel Unwin was cre‑
ating a new order after the trauma of World War II or rather trying to re ‑create 
some old dream ‑world restored, in which implacable British sergeant‑ 
majors bawled for ever over far ‑flung parade grounds and men followed 
well ‑trodden paths to glory and knighthoods? He was fifty ‑five. And 
I had the insight of an infant. But it seems, now, that I could have told 
him then: that world was gone. An axe had dropped on it.21 
17 Swift, Ever After, 7.
18 Wright, Speaking Desires, 81–82.
19 Elizabeth Wright, Psychoanalytic Criticism – A Reappraisal (New York: Routledge), 103.
20 Jacques Lacan, “Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet,” Yale French Studies 
55/56 (1977): 38. Lacan also emphasises the communal aspect of mourning in this context: “The 
work of mourning is accomplished at the level of the logos: I say logos rather than group or com‑
munity, although group and community, being organized culturally, are its mainstays.”
21 Swift, Ever After, 18.
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All of Graham Swift’s novels are built around traumatised narrators striving to 
reintroduce order into their lives precisely through the symbolic mourning of 
what is gone, with varying degree of success. It may in fact be argued that the pro‑
tagonists’ tendency for totalising first person narratives, which fail to recognize 
the lack implied in language, gradually diminishes. One might situate Bill Unwin 
halfway between the rigid, monologic and manipulative narratives of Swift’s early 
novels (Sweet Shop Owner (1980) or Shuttlecock (1982)) and the variety of voices 
or the ethically “awoken” protagonists of his later output (Last Orders (1996) or 
The Light of Day (2003)). This article aims to discuss this process as epitomised 
in the gradual maturation of the protagonist of Ever After towards becoming the 
Lacanian castrated subject in the context of the latter’s discussion of the analo‑
gous progression in Hamlet.
Stef Craps convincingly argues that Unwin’s initial approach to his lost others 
through literary conventions makes him a  melancholic subject, pointing to the 
character’s “moral narcissism” and his use of literature for “aesthetically defusing 
the threat posed to one’s self ‑conception by a  traumatic reality.” Unwin’s “com‑
placent self ‑enclosure”22 is not unlike the avoidance of the dialogic nature of lan‑
guage and the persistence “in an unconscious commitment to suffering as a way 
of refusing to mourn,” observed by Julia Kristeva in “borderline” patients.23 The 
refusal to mourn the loss in turn involves the cannibalistic incorporation of the 
lost other through identification and in denying substitution blocks the move‑
ment of desire. Unwin’s insistence on retaining his lost loved ones also implies 
a reluctance fully to enter the symbolic order and embrace the lack involved with 
it, since, as Sean Homer notes, for Lacan, “the lower case ‘other’ always refers to 
imaginary others. We treat these others as whole, unified or coherent egos, and as 
reflections of ourselves they give us the sense of being complete whole beings.”24 
It is therefore not surprising that the suicide of his terminally ill wife Ruth, fol‑
lowed shortly by the deaths of his mother and stepfather, shatters the stability 
of Unwin’s identity entirely, depriving him of all influences that give meaning to 
it. His response to Ruth’s death bears clear melancholic characteristics when he 
states: “But only Ruth will do. She represented life to me. I know that, now that 
she is dead. She was life to me.”25 Unwin quite explicitly refuses to be consoled by 
the elegiac conventions of linguistic substitute in an explanation of the reasons 
behind his consistent rejection of suggestions that he should write a biography of 
his wife, who had been a famous actress: “Each time, it has come with the tacit, 
the soft ‑toned hint that this might be, as it were, a cure for grief. But it seems to 
22 Craps, Trauma and Ethics, 140–41.
23 Wright, Speaking Desires, 5: “In her clinical material she shows her patients to be wavering 
between neurosis and psychosis in their attempts to avoid dialogue with the world as it is repre‑
sented by their analyst and significant figures of their past.”
24 Homer, Jacques Lacan, 70.
25 Swift, Ever After, 120.
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me it would be an impossibility, a falsehood, a sham. It’s not the life, is it, but the 
life? The life.”26 In an almost literal rendering of the melancholic condition in 
which the lost object becomes identified with loss itself, Unwin concludes: “And 
nothing is left but this impossible absence. This space at your side the size of 
a woman, the size of a life, the size – of the world. Ah, yes, the monstrosity, the 
iniquity of love – that another person should be the world.”27 Unwin’s insistence 
on refusing substitutes is matched by the insistence with which substitution is 
pressed on him. In fact – as Stef Craps observes – his suicide attempt is triggered 
precisely by the realisation that a new object could replace his lost other: when 
the wife of a fellow scholar attempts to seduce him; to his own surprise he does 
not remain indifferent to her advances and concludes: “It could have been her. It 
could have been us.”28 This incident takes place three days after the stepfather’s 
revelation that Unwin is not the son of the man he had mourned. The rejected 
substitute father thus also makes Unwin realise that the “genuine article” was no 
more than a substitute himself. Unwin has to recognise that it is impossible to use 
strictly symbolic structures – the models of literature, romantic love – which are 
repeatedly demonstrated by the narrator himself to be no more than the product 
of literary conventions, or the narratives of history – to recreate the pre ‑lingusitic 
sense of unity with the world. Disgusted as he is with the hypocrisy and inau‑
thenticity of social existence, Unwin has no choice but to face the fact that the 
very notion of “the real thing” is a construct precisely of the Symbolic.
The protagonist’s eventual reluctant embrace of the inevitability of substitu‑
tion comes only after a  long struggle, initiated by a  disturbed Oedipal resolu‑
tion, marking his later relations to his others. Colonel Unwin’s suicide triggers in 
his son a re ‑entry into the symbolic in which he self ‑consciously identifies with 
Hamlet, presenting himself as similarly haunted by the neglect of mourning ritu‑
als and a “ghostly identification”29 with his dead father, making his turmoil paral‑
lel to Shakespeare’s “drama of blocked desire [and] the mourning that is required 
to unblock it,”30 at the same time allowing it to be considered from the perspec‑
tive of Lacan’s elaboration of symbolic castration and constitution of the subject 
by use of Hamlet. Lacan’s profound reworking of the Freudian interpretation of 
the play involves a shift from a focus on Hamlet’s Oedipal desire to “his situation 
of dependence with respect to the desire of the Other, the desire of his mother.”31 
The child is wholly at the mother’s mercy when he faces the fact that her desire 
is not directed at him in its entirety. It is her reply to the child’s question about 
his place in the structure of signification that causes him to realise that his desire 
26 Ibid., 253.
27 Ibid., 256.
28 Ibid., 245.
29 Ibid., 63.
30 Wright, Speaking Desires, 81. 
31 Lacan, Interpretation of Desire, 17.
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may never be fulfilled because his mother’s is not either. This reply makes the 
child realise that he is merely a  substitute for the mother’s missing phallus.32 
Gertrude’s inappropriately quick second marriage is in a  sense such a  reply to 
Hamlet’s “What do you want from me?” question, one which, according to Bruce 
Fink, does not explain to Hamlet his position in the structure of the symbolic but 
rather converts his desire into a demand for attention.33 Hamlet is therefore not 
introduced to the signifier of lack in the other, which might effectively enable the 
fully ‑fledged desire and jouissance associated with symbolic castration.34 He is 
instead left to continue striving “to separate himself from the demand of the (m)
other and realize his own desire.”35
Like Hamlet, Bill Unwin finds himself unable to mourn his dead father. After 
Colonel Unwin’s suicide, he is preoccupied with mourning for the paradisiacal 
world of his childhood, spent largely with his mother in Paris, a  city described 
by him as a  “palpable network of ‘scenes’, ”36 impossible to distinguish from his 
perception of it. This is his imaginary period of the mother‑child dyad, where he 
learns from Sylvia Unwin, his mother, “to see the world as a  scintillating shop 
window, a  confection, a  display of tempting frippery.”37 In this setting, Unwin 
feels much closer to her than to her considerably older husband and his reaction 
to the latter’s death is not unaffected by the context. At first, the young Unwin’s 
sorrow focuses on not having been able to participate in his father’s imagined 
life as a  spy: “For a while the delusion was so strong that it turned into a pang 
of regret: I  had discovered this source of excitement too late – I  could never, 
now, have access to it.”38 Even when the sorrow for the loss of the father – or the 
remorse for the absence thereof – finally appears, it also takes a form of mourn‑
ing the imaginary: Unwin refuses to grieve for the deceased, focusing instead on 
being deprived of the experience of encountering a  “vision made fact”39 in the 
shape of Paris. “Only when the image of my ballet ‑girls faded did grief for my 
father emerge to take place. Or rather … a  nagging, self ‑pitying, self ‑accusing 
emotion born of the guilt at not feeling grief.” Unwin also describes “a  mood 
of redundancy, which it occurred to me my father must have felt too,” which 
appears when he takes the position of the father as “an adjunct, an accessory, 
a supernumerary” to the mother and her lover. This identification in turn moti‑
32 Dylan Evans, Dictionary, 117.
33 Fink, “Reading Hamlet with Lacan,” 190: “according to Lacan she says she has to be ‘get‑
ting it’ all the time.” Her reply to her son’s question, focused according to Lacan exclusively on 
herself: “I am what I am; in my case there’s nothing to be done, I’m a true genital personality – 
I know nothing of mourning.”
34 Fink, “Reading Hamlet with Lacan,” 191.
35 Homer, Jacques Lacan, 78.
36 Swift, Ever After, 13. 
37 Ibid., 16.
38 Ibid., 21.
39 Ibid., 19.
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vates the idealisation of Colonel Unwin: “I began to summon a father I had never 
really known: noble, virtuous, wronged.”40 According to Elizabeth Wright, an 
analogous approach to his own father indicates Hamlet’s inability to complete 
the process of castration.41 Unwin thus appears to persist in his attachment to the 
imaginary phallus, like Hamlet “unable to mourn the loss of the phallus that will 
inaugurate the movement of his own desire” and stuck in a narcissism associated 
by Lacan with the imaginary order.42
The questions Bill Unwin might want to address to his mother, concerning 
his identity and origins, remain unanswered until Sylvia is on her deathbed.43 
This reticence is explained by her distrust of storytelling, contrasted with the raw, 
immediate experience: “For all her vocal powers, for all her capacity to chatter, 
squeal, and, sometimes, shriek, my mother was never an eager raconteuse. I think 
she regarded reminiscence and tale ‑telling as a kind of weakness, an avoidance of 
the central issue of life, which was to wring the most out of the present.”44 Sylvia 
Unwin’s role in her son’s Oedipal crisis is suitably analogous to that of Gertrude 
in Hamlet. Described by Unwin as “a woman given to severing herself from the 
past,”45 marked by a sensuous enjoyment of the present and insatiable sexuality, she 
remains appropriately unmoved by her husband’s desperate deed. When announc‑
ing the tragedy to her son, “she is not smiling (or crying). She is composed and 
authoritative; the hug is like some solemn ceremony.”46 Like Gertrude’s, her basic 
inability to mourn also constitutes a message to her son, complicating his quest 
to understand the desire of the Other and his position in it. Sylvia Unwin corre‑
sponds well with Lacan’s interpretation of Gertrude as the (m)Other who aims to 
satisfy her own lack and prevents her son’s entry into the symbolic by communi‑
cating to him that achieving this does not involve castration.47 Her advising Unwin 
“against the ruinous desire to outwit mortality”48 may be interpreted in this light 
as a  form of taking a stance against entering the symbolic, against the lack that 
this involves, a declaration of living entirely in the present. However, like Ham‑
let, Bill Unwin is no longer able or willing to return to the pre ‑Oedipal dyad.49
40 Ibid., 63.
41 Wright, Speaking Desires, 84.
42 Homer, Jacques Lacan, 77. 
43 And even then the reply leaves out crucial information, such as the identity of Bill’s father.
44 Swift, Ever After, 26.
45 Ibid., 45.
46 Ibid., 20.
47 Wright, Speaking Desires, 79.
48 Swift, Ever After, 231. Describing the fates of her grandfather’s and her uncle’s failed 
careers, Sylvia claims that in both cases “it was craven fear of oblivion, the desire to cheat death 
by the vain quest for distinction that was the root of the matter” (27).
49 As an adult he questions his mother’s relation to him; her “divinizing the world and 
emphasizing the bond between them is revealed as a crude strategy of self -aggrandizement and 
egotistical projection” (Craps, Trauma and Ethics, 125).
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Bruce Fink argues that this is impossible for Hamlet, because the first stage of his 
symbolic castration, that of alienation, has already taken place. Similarly, Unwin 
“has entered the Other’s world … and assimilated the Other’s language and the 
desire with which it is ridden, but separation has not occurred.”50 He declares 
a love of literature as “this other world, this second world to fall back on – a more 
reliable world in so far as it does not hide that its premise is illusion,”51 which, 
as Stef Craps notes, is valuable to him primarily as a stabilising influence on the 
chaos of reality. In Unwin’s narrative, literature, “instead of being a locus for the 
meditation of one voice against another, turns into a  single subject’s fantasy of 
its full accession of drive, an anarchic conviction that the symbolic guarantees 
the unalloyed, unrestrained achievement of a  blissful union in which the pain 
of division would be expelled forever.”52 His identifications with literary models 
appear to ignore the limitations of the symbolic; both his others and he him‑
self are assumed to be figures in prescribed scenarios and Unwin is repeatedly 
surprised by people not behaving the way he imagines they should. True to his 
Hamlet identification, Unwin expects a confession of guilt and shame at contrib‑
uting to his father’s suicide both from his mother and stepfather. As an adult, 
remembering himself asking Sylvia Unwin about the motives of the desperate 
act, he still believes that “it was the moment, of course, for her to have broken 
down, wept, begged my forgiveness, confessed that her shamelessness had driven 
a man to his death. The things that happen in opera, they happen in life too. But 
she didn’t.”53 Sam Ellison also refuses to play along with Unwin’s imagination 
when, years later, he decides to reveal that the main motive might have been the 
fact that Colonel Unwin was not Bill’s father: “You see, I think, astonishing as it 
seems, that he is coming, after all these years, to apologize; to make a clean breast 
of it … He is here (Claudius at his prayers) to atone for his part in my father’s 
death.”54 Unwin himself is unable to enforce the adolescent dream of killing his 
stepfather who, like Claudius for Hamlet, “represents the completion that [he] 
wants to be for the mother: this completion must be there because this is where 
Gertrude finds it with Claudius.”55 This in turn does not allow Unwin to separate 
himself from the other’s desire, not having confronted a  lack in his mother, for 
whom there is apparently nothing to mourn. The melancholic refusal to mourn 
observed in Unwin indeed equals the subject’s inability to abandon the assump‑
tion that he or she can become the only object of the mother’s desire (in replac‑
ing the father whom Unwin quite literally imagines to have embodied it) and in 
consequence to perceive the phallus as representing her lack rather than self‑ 
50 Fink, Reading, 192. 
51 Swift, Ever After, 69.
52 Wright, Speaking Desires, 39–40.
53 Swift, Ever After, 22–23.
54 Ibid., 154.
55 Wright, Speaking Desires, 84.
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sufficiency and completeness. The narrator’s failure in making this shift is argu‑
ably repeated when he loses his wife – once again, in a parallel to Hamlet, in the 
context of repeated insufficient mourning.56
What Elizabeth Wright proposes to be the task of the artist in the light of 
Lacan’s contribution to critical theory is arguably what Unwin is initially unable 
to achieve in his narrative. Lacan believes that “the artist knows – and shows 
the spectator that he knows – that he himself suffers the same lack.” Therefore, 
the role of a  work of art is not to enable the artist to share with the audience 
a sense of inner harmony but rather a desire or lack, in order “mutually to sustain 
a renunciation of a fantasy.”57 This is arguably what the text of Matthew Pearce’s 
notes finally does for Unwin. Stef Craps points out that Unwin’s pre ‑Oedipal 
sense of completeness linked with times before his “world … had fallen apart (it 
did, you see) with [his] father’s death”58 is an entirely fictional construct corre‑
sponding to Lacan’s imaginary order and the protagonist’s task after his own “lit‑
tle bout” with death is not to regain the supposed lost paradise but to find a way 
“of acknowledging and affirming its radical absence.”59 Craps further argues that 
in the course of his narrative Unwin achieves a change towards a more dialogic 
understanding of speech and abandons his insistence on “capturing ‘the real 
thing’, the elusive self ‑completing object, necessarily replaced by substitutes.”60 
This movement towards accepting the lack inscribed in the symbolic is moti‑
vated by his encounter with the radical otherness in the form of his maternal 
great ‑grandfather’s diary and letters, effectively opposing his totalising interpre‑
tation. Initially, the figure of Matthew Pearce performs for Unwin the same role 
that Laertes performed for Hamlet as the ideal ego. Treated like a relic of a pre‑ 
Oedipal omnipotence associated with infantile narcissism, Pearce becomes for 
Unwin “an original core of identity,”61 which he inscribes with “stability, … an 
intuitive sense that all things must have their basis.”62 Unwin’s initial treatment of 
his ancestor’s testimony is in a way analogous to the operation of ideal ego, which 
is satisfied with the illusion of omnipotence, in contrast to the ego ideal, whose 
self ‑esteem is based on following the standards set by the superego. As Sophie De 
Mijolla ‑Mellor puts it, “The ideal ego … appears to be a way of short ‑circuiting 
the work that the ego ideal requires by assuming that its goals, or any others that 
56 Lacan refers to Polonius’s hasty, secretive inhumation and “the whole business of Ophe‑
lia’s burial” (Interpretation of Desire, 40); in Ever After, Unwin describes Sylvia’s death soon after 
Ruth’s as cruelly “stealing her afterlife” but at the same time perhaps mercifully “shocking him 
out of the shock” (Swift, Ever After, 30–31).
57 Wright, Reappraisal, 110.
58 Swift, Ever After, 114.
59 Craps, Trauma and Ethics, 125.
60 Ibid., 121.
61 Ibid., 138.
62 Swift, Ever After, 91.
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might be still higher, have already been attained.”63 Openly acknowledging that 
this is a manipulation, Unwin ignores evidence that Pearce’s wife Elisabeth might 
have been unfaithful to him and creates an idealised image of their marital life 
to quiet his suspicions concerning his own wife’s fidelity. The figure of Pearce 
becomes for Unwin an idealised imagined father by means of an analogy intro‑
duced in the diaries themselves which describe Pearce finding a substitute for his 
own estranged father in the person of his father ‑in ‑law. Eventually, Matthew is 
reconciled with his father, who 
confessed, if not in so many words, that he was always jealous of the 
faith that I had kept but which he in his innermost heart had lost. Jeal‑
ous, furthermore, of the good Rector, in whom he thought I had found 
a father – since a spiritual father – preferable to him … he supposed that 
I found thereby a sanctuary he could not provide.64 
However, the sanctuary of re ‑found religious certainty eventually proves con‑
tingent and insupportable. While the bereavement of his pious mother in his 
childhood only strengthens Pearce, since “her memory became a  shrine of all 
his religious feeling,” and “the Bible would remain for him the sole consolation 
for his mother’s inexplicable departure, the only true reply to death,” the loss of 
his son, combined with his discovery of an ichthyosaur skeleton ten years earlier 
and the resulting interest in Darwin’s theory of evolution, shakes the very frame‑
work to which Pearce referred in managing the first bereavement. As Unwin 
observes, commenting on Pearce’s life story, “for all his early training, he does 
not seem to have been able to sustain the same trauma from the opposite end: 
the death in 1854 of his son Felix … heralded the collapse of Matthew’s spir‑
itual certainty.”65 After a  long period during which Pearce hides his doubts out 
of a  sense of duty towards his family, he finds himself unable to keep up the 
pretence. A  final confrontation with his father ‑in ‑law, with whom he had been 
sharing his troubled thoughts, leads to the painful decision to abandon his wife 
and children. Later, he decides to leave for America and in a farewell letter to his 
wife, Elizabeth, confesses “to have struggled to keep doubts under guard while 
maintaining a sanguine face to the world, like a sick person wishing not to infect 
others,” but concludes that he “came to believe … that though ignorance may be 
bliss, happiness is not to be purchased by a refusal of knowledge.”66 In the same 
letter, Pearce leaves to his wife the evidence of his spiritual torment in the form 
63 “Ego Ideal/Ideal Ego,” in International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, ed. Alain de Mijolla 
(2005), accessed December 28, 2011, http://www.enotes.com/ego -ideal -ideal -ego -reference
64 Swift, Ever After, 54.
65 Ibid., 95.
66 Ibid., 52.
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of his notebooks. Surprising in their significance even to their author,67 the notes 
may be seen as serving to overcome the “symbolic impasse” which Darian Leader 
presents as an aspect of negotiation of losses.68 Unable to give up the self ‑image 
based on how she was perceived by the mourned person, the bereaved may find 
it impossible to locate herself in the Symbolic, since “the symbolic Other is not 
there to situate him, and so all he is left with is his own image, unanchored and 
unchained.”69 Once Pearce arrives at the decision to leave his family, the notes are 
discontinued as if they have served their purpose. The act of giving up what he 
describes as “evidence of me”70 constitutes the kind of symbolic sacrifice which, 
as Leader argues, is crucial to the work of mourning as a means of constituting 
the object. Unlike melancholia, where the lost object embodies the dimension 
of lack itself and thus becomes impossible to give up without experiencing the 
loss as “an unbearable whole which threatens to engulf [the melancholic] at all 
times,”71 mourning allows for a separation of the object from the space previously 
occupied by it and thus enables substitution. The abandoning of the book is very 
much like the rituals referred to by Leader, where throwing into the grave a part 
of the mourner’s body (a lock of hair, a fingernail, a finger) prevents the mourner 
from being engulfed whole by identification with the dead.72 Pearce’s notes are 
such a substitute, a trace of the subject sacrificed instead of the subject himself. 
This ability to sever the links with the past even in the face of their persistence 
is entirely beyond Unwin’s grasp. While Stef Craps calls Pearce another “victim to 
the imperialism of Bill’s voracious self, which seeks to reduce the outside world to 
its own solipsistic terms,”73 he nevertheless concludes that in this case “the possi‑
bility of possession of the other is exposed as a delusion” since, instead of stabilis‑
ing Unwin’s sense of identity, Pearce’s narrative undermines his totalising tenden‑
cies, forcing him to surrender “the narcissistic fantasy that the self ‑completing 
object can be had and that the real thing can be seized hold of.”74 Pearce’s incom‑
prehensible behaviour – abandoning the illusion of familial happiness in the face 
of his loss of religious faith – confronts Unwin with “the signifier of desire that 
just is – having no rhyme or reason, no explanation, justification, or raison d’être.” 
Thus, Pearce might be seen as enabling Unwin to associate the object of the oth‑
er’s desire with objet a rather than the phallus, triggering separation for him and 
67 Shortly before finishing them, Pearce wonders: “What have I become, that I have parted 
from my wife, but still keep company with this book?” (Swift, Ever After, 183)
68 Darian Leader, The New Black. Mourning, Melancholia and Depression (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 2008), 187.
69 Leader, New Black, 186.
70 Swift, Ever After, 52.
71 Leader, New Black, 193.
72 Ibid., 194.
73 Craps, Trauma and Ethics, 139. 
74 Ibid., 144. 
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allowing him to conclude his accession to the symbolic.75 Unwin’s mourning may 
finally become adequate and “the narcissistic investment that prevents [him] act‑
ing in his own time be surrendered.” As a subject no longer striving for imaginary 
plenitude, he can be situated in the symbolic register,76 following the example of 
Pearce himself, faced with the absence of religious certainty (also in the persons 
of his father figures).
If mourning of the phallus is to be accomplished on the level of the symbolic, 
and the result of the process is to be the acceptance of its inadequacies, one might 
say that this is what Unwin achieves in his diary, as demonstrated by the final 
scene of the novel, the reminiscence of his first night with Ruth during which 
he shared with her the memory of his father’s death. Like Hamlet, half ‑detached 
from life by his own suicidal attempt (he speaks of “a  ghostly disconnection 
from myself ”77), Unwin demonstrates his recognition of the lack in the Other by 
marking the romantic union with his consciousness of both Ruth’s and his own 
later repetition of Colonel Unwin’s gesture of self ‑annihilation. The ambiguous 
chorus of the section, “He took his life,” apart from its obvious melancholic con‑
notations, implies a readiness to embrace the contingency of the human condi‑
tion with its inevitable losses, demonstrating Unwin’s liberation both from the 
destructive melancholic wish to retain the lost past and from the obligation of 
complete mournful decathexis, the struggle against which had brought him to 
the brink of self ‑annihilation. Wendy Wheeler notes: “This ambiguity – a  sort 
of agreement not to close off, or possess, the meaning of the object – suggests 
a desire to tolerate anxiety and ambivalence which is part of the relinquishment 
of narcissistic melancholia.”78 As Lacan puts it, explaining Hamlet’s hesitation in 
taking his revenge on Claudius: “It’s a question of the phallus, and that’s why he 
will never be able to strike it, until the moment when he has made the complete 
sacrifice – without wanting to, moreover – of all narcissistic attachments, that is 
when he is mortally wounded and knows it.”79 The final scene of the novel could 
in this light be seen as the surrendering of the imaginary pre ‑Oedipal complete‑
ness and thus fulfillment of the precondition for castration, the shift from imagi‑
nary to symbolic phallus enabling the (re ‑)entering into the symbolic order of 
social interaction.
Bill Unwin’s encounter with his own transience leaves him in a state where he is 
indeed “mortally wounded” and forces him to give up the dream of a stable, origi‑
nal, complete selfhood based on his narcissistic emotional investments. Unwin’s 
75 Fink, Reading, 191.
76 Wright, Speaking Desires, 82.
77 Swift, Ever After, 231.
78 Wendy Wheeler, “Melancholic Modernity and Contemporary Grief,” in Literature and the 
Contemporary: Fictions and Theories of the Present, eds. Roger Luckhurst and Peter Marks (Har‑
low: Longman/Pearson, 1999), 75. 
79 Lacan, Interpretation of Desire, 51.
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relinquishing of the imaginary phallus is indicated in a desperate renunciation of 
his quest for a clear ground of his identity: “Who am I? Who am I? A nobody. An 
heirless nonentity. What’s more – a bastard.”80 The ultimate recognition of his affin‑
ity with the father figure is grounded precisely in the latter’s constitutional absence. 
Unwin is finally able to become reconciled with his own losses when he acknowl‑
edges the double absence of the father figure81 and recognizes the same deadly 
emptiness in himself as a  failed suicide. The father becomes his objet a, not an 
original object to be retrieved but a non ‑existent one, given value only by Unwin’s 
desire “to fill the emptiness or void at the core of subjectivity and the symbolic that 
creates the Thing, as opposed to the loss of some original Thing creating the desire 
to find it.”82 All the defining discourses and figures in Unwin’s life are revealed 
as insufficient or missing in more than one sense and he arguably accepts that as 
a subject he is literally dependent on the absences he has been forced to face.
80 Swift, Ever After, 232.
81 That is, the fact that the man whom he mourned was not his biological father and that the 
biological father himself had been killed in the war before the other’s suicide.
82 Homer, Jacques Lacan, 85.
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Ja to nie ja 
(Re)konstrukcja tożsamości w Raz na zawsze (Ever After) Grahama Swifta
St re sz cz en ie
Na powieść Grahama Swifta Raz na zawsze (Ever After, 1992) składają się – jak mówi sam 
narrator – „słowa nieboszczyka”. Naznaczony przez samobójstwo ojca, niełatwą relację z  matką 
i ojczymem, a w końcu samobójczą śmierć żony, Bill Unwin zmaga się przez całe życie z poczu‑
ciem braku autentyczności i  obsesyjnym pragnieniem odkrycia takich metod autoidentyfikacji, 
które mogłyby go z  niego wyzwolić. Jego rozpaczliwe próby wykształcenia stabilnej tożsamości 
niezmiennie spełzają na niczym, prowadząc ostatecznie do próby samobójczej, po której Unwin 
podejmuje wysiłek zrozumienia swojej nowej sytuacji, jako człowieka, który „reinkarnuje się 
w  plastiku”. Obrazy związane z  przemysłem górniczym, które w  narracji Unwina pojawiają się 
za sprawą pamiętników jego wiktoriańskiego przodka, sugerują, jak zauważa Frederick Holmes, 
zarówno możliwość odnalezienia rdzenia tożsamości, odkrycia jej jak rudy, w stanie naturalnym, 
jak i konieczność rafinacji, przetwarzania czy produkcji tego, co zostaje odkryte. W świetle psy‑
choanalitycznej teorii żałoby jako procesu pod wieloma względami analogicznego do rozwiązania 
sytuacji edypalnej, a  tym samym kluczowego dla formowania podmiotu, fakt stopniowej akcep‑
tacji przez Unwina jego niejednoznacznego i nierozwiązywalnego przywiązania do opłakiwanych 
bliskich oraz że rezygnuje on z  jednoznacznego rozróżnienia między pogardzanym substytutem 
a  nieosiągalną autentycznością, można postrzegać jako – jakkolwiek niechętne – wypełnienie 
Freudowskiego wezwania do, cytując Tammy Clewell, „wyrzeczenia się pragnienia jasno określo‑
nej tożsamości, nieobciążonej zobowiązaniami wobec utraconych innych czy przeszłości”.
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Moi ce n’est pas moi 
(Re)construction de l’identité dans À tout jamais (Ever After) de Graham Swift
Ré su mé
Le roman À tout jamais (Ever After, 1992) de Graham Swift se compose – comme le dit le 
narrateur lui ‑même – « des propos du cadavre ». Marqué par le suicide de son père, par une rela‑
tion difficile avec sa mère et son beau ‑père, enfin par la mort suicidaire de sa femme, Bill Unwin 
se débat durant toute sa vie contre le sentiment du manque d’authenticité et le désir de trouver 
de telles méthodes de l’autoidentification qui pourraient l’en délivrer. Ses tentatives désespérées 
de développer une identité stable échouent constamment en le menant finalement à une tentative 
de suicide, après laquelle Unwin s’efforce de comprendre sa nouvelle situation comme un homme 
qui «  se réincarne dans du plastique  ». Les images liées à l’industrie minière (qui apparaissent 
dans la narration de Unwin à cause des mémoires de son ancêtre victorien) suggèrent – comme 
le note Frederick Holmes – à la fois une possibilité de trouver la quintessence de son identité, de 
la découvrir comme on découvre du minerai, à l’état naturel, et la nécessité de raffiner, de trans‑
former ou de produire ce qui est découvert. À la lumière de la théorie psychanalytique du deuil 
en tant que procédé analogue à plusieurs égards à la solution d’une situation œdipienne et par 
conséquent essentiel pour la formation du sujet, le fait que Urwin accepte petit à petit son atta‑
chement ambivalent et insoluble aux proches qu’il déplore, et qu’il renonce à la différentiation 
univoque entre un substitut méprisé et une authenticité impossible à atteindre peut être perçu 
comme – quoiqu’à contrecœur – une réalisation de l’appel freudien à – en citant Tammy Clewell 
– « abandonner la volonté d’avoir une identité clairement définie et n’étant pas chargée d’obliga‑
tions envers les proches décédés et le passé ».
